EACH NATION'S ARK ON THE WAVES OF NEW "MIGRATION FLOOD". ROMANIA'S INSTITUTIONAL AND CULTURAL PREPAREDNESS

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Abstract: *The current paper approaches a topic of maximum relevance for regional and national security: the effects of migratory waves from the conflict zones of the Middle East on Romania's capacity to adapt to the dynamics of illegal cross-border flows. It has been revealed as a particular reflection of the subject of a broad research on the Islamic State (Daesh) and the impact of its actions on global/regional/national security. Under these circumstances, the present paper approaches aspects related to one of the major effects of the actions performed by the Islamic State: the displacement of migratory waves from the Middle East conflict zones and their absorption in Europe. At the same time, the paper focuses on Romania's role in the migration crisis, as a disjunctive element in rapport with the topic of the broad research, analyzing the cultural impact of the immigration phenomenon. Despite a rich and diverse specialized literature, from the perspective of its approach to the effects that immigration produces in Europe (focusing on political, cultural, religious and economic aspects), especially numerous articles expressing mainly the European version of the matter, the researchers belonging to the transit or target-countries, the immigration phenomenon is not the subject of a thorough cultural and security analysis in the Romanian academic environment. Starting from this premise and from the original purpose of the research - the analysis of the effects of the Islamic State actions - we opted for a thorough research, involving the use of qualitative research methods: the semi-structured interview with specialists and the participatory observation, engaging equally political decision-makers, diplomats, religious leaders, academics (national security specialists), intelligence analysts, opinion makers. The deep-dive interview, conducted in Romanian, Arabic or English, with 31 subjects covering the above mentioned areas of expertise, with experience in national security, over 50 years of age, coming from Europe and the Middle East but also from the United States of America or Africa (Romanian, Turkish, Dutch, Syrian, Israeli, Palestinian, Egyptian, American), Orthodox, Catholic, Muslim or Mosaic Christians provide a comprehensive reading that is appropriate to the need for a deep knowledge of a phenomenon holding great implications for global, regional and national security. Through this article, which involves a multifaceted and complex approach to the immigration phenomenon as a Euro-Atlantic security dimension, as defined by the National Defense Strategy for the period 2015-2019 (2015: 13), we intend to offer a complex framework of analysis consistent with the promotion of legal migration, while reducing the security risks involved.*

Keywords*: The Islamic State (Daesh); Middle East; European crisis of migration; national security.*

1. PRELIMINARY EXPLANATIONS FOR AN UNWELCOME METAPHOR OR THE ACTUAL INTRODUCTION INTO THE MATTER

Prior to designing the study on the preparedness of European nations to face migratory waves and their effects, I reread David Shariatmadari's simple and conclusive text about "toxic metaphors" describing the migration generated by the recent Middle East conflicts, published in *The Guardian*, in 2015. We agree with the author of this text from many points of view, starting with the analysis of how language changes the way of thinking - with a personal interpretation nuanced in relation to that of

Shariatmadari's, with regard to the Shapir-Whorf hypothesis or the linguistic relativism. The shocking and unexpected phenomenon of contemporary migration, generated by profound causes, requires a humanitarian approach to what is happening with the waves of displaced people from their own countries, leaving to seek a safer future, risking their and their family members' lives in order to provide them with chances of decent living.

The debate on migration has given rise to many "toxic, inhuman, cynical" metaphors. Shariatmadari reminds us of some of the most prominent until the publication of the article in the British public space: "swarm of people coming across the Mediterranean" (Prime Minister David Cameron),

"marauding" (Philip Hammond, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs) "flood" (Daily Express, BBC), "stream" (BBC), etc.

> So what are the ones [A/N - metaphors] we've picked to represent the movement of people to and around Europe? MIGRANTS ARE INSECTS is the metaphor favored by Cameron. It's a subset of MIGRANTS ARE ANIMALS, and basis of Gillian Duffy's famous 'flocking' comment. Hammond employs MIGRANTS ARE AN INVADING ARMY, the BBC ant the Express, MIGRATION IS INUNDATION. When set out so starkly it's clear that these metaphors are way over the top. Not to mention dehumanizing, ridiculously, simplistic, pitched at around the intellectual level of a dark-ages Anglo Saxon covering in a thatched hut. (Shariatmadari, 2015).

This perspective - toxic at the level of language - has the role of changing perceptions, raising fears, cultivating fear, creating certain expectations. Then, where does this projection by the title of this article on the "flood" of migration come from? The answer is simple: the subject under discussion is not "the flood of migration", but the preparation of the 'arc' "of every people to oppose the 'flood' of political discourse" of each state that opposes the most significant social, political and cultural change in recent years. The "migration flood" is a reported discursive element; it is the fundamental metaphor, toxic in its core, which is part of the current political discourse, especially of the European countries characterized by illiberal regimes. The object of our analysis is the "preparation of the ark" of each European nation and its construction for "salvation". The design of the "Romanian ark" is no exception - the public debate on security policy proposals and projections in the context of the current immigration phenomenon - and the understanding of this approach requires employment both from a cultural perspective and from the perspective of security studies. Therefore, this analysis will focus on two fundamental aspects: the immigration phenomenon as such and its effects on Romania, not before a proper methodology of study is discussed.

2. MERE "INUNDATION" OR THE SIGNS OF "FLOOD"? WORKING METHODOLOGY

In order to analyze the contemporary migration phenomenon generated by conflicts in the Middle East, we chose to start from the causes and to inquire in depth how migration - one of the effects of the unsettled crises in the area - has become a major subject of debate on European security. The widespread migration problem of the Middle East conflict has been long studied over the last three years (2015-2018).

The specialized literature is very broad and diverse in its approach, with a deeper analytical focus from an economic perspective, without losing political, cultural, religious engagements. Most published articles express the European perspective: Sirkeci *et al.* (2015), Haller & Verwiehe (2016), Geddes & Scholten (2016), Bourbeau (2017), Ritzen & Kahanec (2017), Freedman *et al.* (2017), Perocco & Fratesi (2018), King & Okolski (2018), Karim & Al-Rawi (2018), etc. as a projection of authors from transit countries or from target countries. There are coordinated studies of specialists from outside countries that include migration routes: Dragostinova (2016), Niu & Fan (2016), Samaddar (2016), Salazar (2017), Al-Masri & Curran (2017), but these are exceptions to those made *in situ*. Concerning the perspective of the Romanian school, the studies reveal important economic aspects: Zaharia *et al.* (2017), Dumitru (2017), Androniceanu & Vasile (2018), or reflecting a political position through new media or classical media: Momoc (2016), Otovescu & Otovescu (2017), Kantor & Cepoi (2018) but they focus less on national security: Iov & Micaş (2017), Răducanu (2018) and cultural issues are almost unnoticed.

Against this background, based on a broader research - the analysis of the effects produced by the actions of the Islamic State (Daesh) - we opted for a digression in relation to the central theme, consisting of a deep analysis of one of the effects of Daesh actions: illegal migration from the Middle East caused by conflicts in the area. In this sense, we designed a qualitative depth research, achieved by a semi-structured interview with specialists (duplicating the participatory observation of one of the authors, Ammar El Benni, originating in the Middle East, in the Lebanese city of Tripoli). The interviewees (31) are politicians/parliamentarians, diplomats, religious leaders, academics (national security specialists), intelligence officers, security staff, opinion makers. These specialists are of Romanian, Turkish, Dutch, Syrian, Israeli, Palestinian, Egyptian and U.S nationalities, more precisely, they come from Europe, the Middle East, North Africa and the United States of America, have experience in national security, are over 50 and are, from a confessional point of view, Orthodox, Catholic, Muslim or Mosaic Christians. The

purpose of this projection was to cover, in terms of knowledge needs in depth and from different perspectives, all possible perspectives of interest, in order to provide a complex reading necessary for understanding the immigration phenomenon and its security and cultural effects on Europe. Interviews were conducted, as appropriate, in Romanian, Arabic or English.

For an easier interpretation of the research results, I numbered the interviewed specialists in relation to the alphabetical order of their names and pre-codified the genre variables: male (M) and feminine (F); religion: Christian Orthodox (CO), Catholic (CC), Islamic (IS), Mosaic (MO); profession: parliamentary (PA), diplomat (Di), university professor (PU), intelligence analyst (AI), religious leader (LR), military (Of), journalist (Ju); age: 30-40 years (3+), 40-50 years (4+), 50-60 years (5+), 60-70 years (6+); Country of origin: Romania (RO), Israel (IL), Syria (SY), Egypt (ET), Turkey (TR), U.S.A. (US), Palestinian territory (PS). For example, topic 1 will be coded as follows: 01 MCOPa4+RO.

3. "MIGRATION FLOOD"

3.1 Waves generated by the "Arab Spring" and their effects. The "Migration Flood" came to the public's attention in the spring of 2015, when more than 1,200 immigrants on five ships drowned in the Mediterranean, near the Italian coastline. Public attention has focused on the three "gates" of entry into Europe: Greece, Italy and Spain, and the European Union has established mandatory refugee quota for its member countries, in a wider set of measures to prevent illegal immigration, "responsibility-sharing among EU countries", adopted by the European Parliament on 29 April 2015.

Europe, which had been the territory to which huge waves of migration headed, especially from the East, had been used to the intensification of intra-European migration in the years after the collapse of the Communist bloc, until the conflicts in the South and Eastern Mediterranean (the so-called Arab Spring debut in 2010). Migration in Europe mainly stood for four major migration channels, as they were called by King & Okolski (2018:14)

> In synthesis, in the geographical domain under consideration, we distinguish four main migration channels:
> (i) intra-EU, from East to West, or more precisely from the 'new' EU countries (EU+10+2+1) to the 'old' EU countries (EU 15) plus Switzerland, Norway and Iceland;

(ii) intra-EU but limited migration between adjacent countries (e.g. Ireland – the UK, Germany – Switzerland, Austria – Germany, etc.);
(iii) migration from non-EU European countries; this covers two subtypes: migration to 'old' EU countries (e.g. Albanians to Italy and Greece) and migration to 'new' EU countries (e.g. Ukrainians to Poland and Slovakia); and
(iv) migration from outside Europe.

After 2015, in this picture of migration, in most Western European and Scandinavian countries, the Syrians are the first in terms of immigration: Austria, Denmark, Germany, Sweden, etc. (apud King & Okolski, 2018:16, *Top five sending countries in selected European Economic Area countries*, an analysis based on OECD indicators included in the International Migration Outlook in various years). Until 2014, and including it, only Sweden had a consistent number of Syrian, Iraqi, Somali, and Poles refugees. But, after 2015, apart from refugees from the above-mentioned states also appeared those from Iraq or Afghanistan. The effect of conflicts in the Middle East and North Africa has begun to be felt throughout Europe and to fuel the fear of the "migration flood".

On the verge of our analysis, in 2019, the gates to Europe remained the same: Greece, Italy and Spain, noting that Italian policies have consistently reduced the number of arrivals in Europe (fig. 1).

In this context, of maintaining an immigration influx from the Middle East through Turkey - Greek islands (Lesbos, Chios, Samos, Kos) - Mainland Greece - Northern Macedonia (alternative routes through Bulgaria and Albania) - Serbia - Central and Western Europe, doubled by the waves of immigrants from Italy and Spain (many immigrants from the Middle East choosing to enter Europe on the other two gates after crossing North Africa), preparing response measures, the "ark" of each state aboard which states can navigate during the "flood migration", turned into a test on their own security strategy and their own commitment to their peoples.

These waves of migration have created what constitutes one of Europe's greatest post-colonial crises, with major effects on the security of European states and on liberalism: "Migration has emerged through recent events in Europe as the unconscious tool of history to end the last liberal empire in the modern age" (Samaddar, 2016:88), producing effects on the core of the European project, "core of unification project" (Samaddar, 2016:89), generating mistrust and aggressive political positions.

Fig.1 Refugees/Immigrants influx of 2019 (*apud* European Commission, Emergency Response Coordination Centre/ ERCC, https://erccportal.jrc.ec.europa.eu/Maps/Daily-maps#)

The positions of the interviewed specialists do not differ from those of the analysts of the phenomenon. Their perspective highlights, in nuance, overlooked or superficially treated issues in the specialized papers dedicated to the phenomenon of migration, which has fundamentally changed Europe. In the interviews, questions about the economic aspects of migration are highlighted - both specialists from Arab and Christian countries - European and national policies are being discussed and debated (with the nuance of lack of coherence and predictability in this sense), social aspects are reflected, with emphasis on issues regarding the safety of individuals, as well as those of cultural aspect, especially reflecting religion. For a systematization of the responses and their analysis, we have chosen to stress the aspects reflected in relation to the four major types of migration effects identified: economic, political, social and cultural, to which we add the effects on security.

3.2 The economic and social effects highlighted by the specialized literature relate mainly to the labor market and public finances. If the main economic effects of migration concern the

growth of the labor force - the migrant mass being predominantly composed of the working age population - and implicitly the labor productivity, with positive effects on GDP, especially in the important economies, the security specialists interviewed highlighted other aspects, less emphasized. One of these is the use of a public discourse (scientifically based on the argument of increasing labor productivity through cheaper labor provided by immigrants), especially in Germany (07MCOPa4+RO).

But this discourse, exploiting the poverty and the needs of immigrants, turns the poor masses of their own countries into masses of people capable of accepting working conditions and wages far below the requirements (08 FCOPa4+RO). In addition, European countries benefit from immigrants – they even need them - because they have an aging population "and need new blood, to have someone to work so as they can be supported with their pensions" (opinion expressed by a Syrian expert, 25 MIsJu4 + SY). Some countries, exemplified by Germany, Norway or France, have been pursuing attraction, selection and recruitment of *head hunting* type. "France, claims the same

subject, 25 MIsJu4 + SY, took all actors, painters, musicians, all Syrian culture. All Syrian artists are in France now, where they were well received."

Another nuanced aspect refers to illegal work in transit countries, encouraged by the citizens of these countries, fueling the underground economy:

> transit countries are affected by the length of immigrants' stay on their territory during their traveling to their destination countries, as they are waiting for the right moment to enter the target area or destination (which can last from a few weeks to a few years), try to find a temporary job on the "black" labor market - thus fueling the underground economy - to make the living gains needed to live and continue their journey (02 MCOPU5+RO).

The warning against unrelated migration costs, does not miss either from the analysis of the interviewed specialists, or the particular economic efforts these costs include and for which some EU member states (and not only) are not prepared (31 COPa4+RO). From a slightly nuanced perspective, one of the interviewed specialists also substantiated political rejection (and social propaganda) on the grounds of economic fears (08 MCOPa4+RO). In the profound analytical debate, the emphasis is placed on two countries, from the economy point of view: Germany, as the emblem of the target countries for refugees, and Turkey, as the emblem of the transit countries. In the latter case, the economic efforts of the Turkish state with more than 3.5 million Syrian refugees that crossed its territory, to which they provided education and health care services worth about $ 30 billion, respectively, the aid channeled to Syria, in the border area, of about $630 million, are data provided by one of the subjects (14 MIsDi3+TR). These efforts are seen from a Syrian perspective as the cost of political negotiations with the European Union:

> The Turks have about 3 million [A/N of refugees] they blackmail Europe with the turning on the tap. From time to time they let them go and renegotiate, then, they turn off the tap, it is a political and economic strategy, they use the refugees to reach their interests. Refugees are helped by the Turks to leave ... sometimes the Turks just close their eyes (25 MIsJu4+SY).

Refugees (especially Syrians) crossing Turkey: 2.5 million by 2016, nearly 3 million in total by 2017, 3.5 million in 2018 at the time of the interview, and nearly 4 million by the time of this analysis (more precisely , 3,644,342 on February 7, 2019, the latest data being updated by the UN Refugee Agency up to the moment of analysis, v. UNCHR, 2019) benefited from the funds mentioned by the interviewed expert, plus a number of other funds earmarked for helping refugees, such as, over 3 billion Euros provided through the European Refugee Facility in Turkey. Overall, the European Union grants a number of trade / trade aid to the countries that temporarily or permanently host immigrants, and this reality has not gone unnoticed (for example, 22 MCOPA4+RO). The financial aspect of the refugee crisis is considered to be fundamental by many respondents - the US should consider funding sources as a priority, one of the surveyed specialists argues, 23 MCCAI5+US.

3.3 The political effects highlighted by specialized studies mainly concern the European public agenda and the political agendas of the European states. The very definition of immigration and immigrants are political issues (Geddes & Sholten, 2016), the very name of "refugee crisis" is a symbolic product of political origin: "The use of term 'crisis' may seem banal, but (...) this label serves a powerful political and symbolic purpose "(Freedman *et al.*, 2017:7).

With regard to Turkey's policy of using refugees, which the Syrian expert MIsJu4+SY insisted on, it follows directly from the contradictory statements of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who made it clear that there was a conditional shift between the position of the state accession negotiations and the number of refugees. But this unfair bargaining has produced effects primarily on the Turkish state through a series of Daesh terrorist attacks, which has led to further measures and the repositioning of the foreign policy of the state. The direct result of rigorous border control with Syria is the lack of any terrorist attack on Turkey's territory since January 2017. Turkey's repositioning in the migratory mass equation was also mentioned in the European documents: "Turkey continues to make commendable efforts to receive, support and host a large numbers of refugees and migrants "(COM (2018) 91 final, 2018:3).

Other political effects observed in a nuanced and profound manner by the interviewed specialists concern the growing disparity between the national policy of some EU Member States and European policies regarding Middle East immigration (26 MIsDi5+ET). The imagological reading of the phenomenon of migration, the transformation of the mass of immigrants into potential terrorists, causes fears and repulsion in some countries (especially in the members of the Visegrad Group), without taking

into account the lives and future of millions of civilians seeking their more secure place in Europe, regardless of the gateway to the mainland. Recently, this radicalization of positioning tends to become increasingly evident and was observed and exposed by the interviewed specialists:

(…) the issue of migration is "enjoying" a unilateral treatment, still acting emotionally and by chance through random measures or improvisations of the "sanitary cordons" kind, without trying to stabilize it through long-term programs meant to lead to eradication or at least to diminish the real causes of migration (excessive pauperization and radicalization of ethnic, religious, cultural, social-political disputes) (02 MCOPU5+RO).

The correct positioning of the population in relation to the phenomenon of migration is the cause of the political positioning of each of the states concerned, it is related to "the policy of each government to manage this phenomenon" (07 MCOPa4+RO). The cases of Germany and Greece, on the one hand, compared to those of Hungary and Austria, on the other, are illustrative and were also provided as examples by the interviewees. However, in order to overcome national discrepancies - especially in the case of states governed by political parties or political alliances - a long-term, consistent and constructive vision is needed, capable of leading to integration rather than forced surveillance (exemplified by the position a left-wing Romanian parliamentarian, 08 FCOPa4+RO):

The European Union must apply long-term solutions to diminish the global number of migrants on the one hand and change attitudes towards those entering Europe, on the other. Confusion between migrants and terrorists is unacceptable. Romania itself has about three million citizens who work and live in other countries, permanently or temporarily. Extreme right-winged and populist speech assimilates these migrants, even if people from the European Union are, technically, only European citizens in mobility. Neoliberal policies must be combated by reducing inequalities in the Union, adopting policies to prevent social exclusion of certain categories (especially young people), to foster access to education and life-giving activities, and prevent them from becoming vulnerable to extremist ideologies. Transforming the Union into a fortress, with completely installed surveillance, is not effective. People's thoughts are hard to watch.

The most important aspect of political nature has not gone unnoticed by the interviewed experts: in order to find a solution to the immigrants crisis, which is but an effect, it is necessary for politicians to solve the crisis in itself (08 FCOPa4+RO), which is also an aspect of the political will: "to achieve a lasting peace in Syria there is need for a political solution" (14 MIsDi3+TR).

3.4 The cultural effects taken into account by specialty studies concern the major religious difference between migrant people - Muslim majority - and most of the continent inhabitatnts, predominantly Christians. These cultural differences have been extensively exploited politically and included in the control information package, which has created fear among the local population. Certainly, the cultural differences and the natural desire of immigrants to preserve their own culture and religion are realities of the phenomenon that began in 2011 and accelerated in 2015, but all the same, in cultural terms (on the symbolic market, more precisely), these realities are exploited unidirectionally and many times incorrectly:

Many immigrants from Arab Spring countries try to preserve their cultural and religious identity. This is evident in their dress, eating, customs, traditions, practices, and other cultural and social activities. Political systems in the European Union countries in many European cities have many features of Arabic cities in terms of markets, shops, restaurants, places of worship and others, which impede at the same time promoting racist discourse towards them, especially linking migration to extremism and terrorism. This is common in many European media and literature, especially after the involvement of Muslim immigrants in a series of bloody events in Europe (Bani Salameh, 2017:251).

The clash between Christian and Muslim civilizations imagined and projected through the media into the collective mentality of people has already produced effects - reticence in the political dialogue with Turkey and rigidizing the country's access conditions to the European Union - and continues to produce, fueling the rupture, distance, even hatred and hostile actions. Other cultural effects reflected in the specialized works refer to the deterritorialization of communities and cultures, which presuppose the maintenance of problems and the creation of a local cultural atmosphere, which makes the local win in the dialogue with the national. Within the boundaries of the local, new layers of identity, cultural and linguistic communities are created, which are rather open to

the intraconfessional but trans-institutional dialogue, in a different, unknown process of acculturation, which creates fear through the novelty of these developments in both directions, including the immigrant population, as well:

> Immigrants find themselves in the cultural spaces between societies and norms; this hybridity affects how they structure their everyday lives and distinguishes them from long-time residents of the country (Timmermans, 2018:54).

In the responses of the interviewed specialists, these cultural effects received deep, nuanced interpretations as a result of direct experience with migrant culture representatives or political decision-makers in the European states that had hostile attitudes. Even if most of the interviewed specialists just preferred to remind cultural effects, some have highlighted cultural differences, habits, education or, more precisely, the lack of education or its inadequacy to the European educational system (02 MCOPU5+RO). From the perspective of Islamic states specialists, specifically from a Syrian perspective, the Syrian refugees' choice for Turkey, Lebanon, Iraq, Jordan, Egypt and North Africa is natural and directly understandable: knowledge of the language and a set of common cultural values (25 MIsJu4+SY), and this justifies the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) data from the end of 2018 early 2019: nearly 5.7 million Syrians have requested political asylum in these countries, of which more than 3.6 million in Turkey and almost one million in Lebanon (UNHCR, 2019). Unlike this huge number in Europe, the total number of Syrian immigrants does not reach 2 million. The explanation is just as simple and signaled by the interviewed experts: cultural differences determine the choice of Muslim countries, despite the higher standard of living in Europe.

It is very important to note the remark of another Syrian, religious leader, who believes that Europe is a cultural bazaar, which adopts and admits, to a certain extent, the preponderantly Arab population (ethnically speaking), predominantly Muslim (from the religion perspective). But in this cultural mosaic, there are limits to acceptance, easy to invoke by influencing the population through mass media. Unlike Western Europe,

> Romanians, even wanting to be racist, cannot, because here tolerance is a value, it is something very old ... The first Jewish refugees from Andalusia came here, from the Balkans they came here, from Crimea they came here ... A Romanian, even if he wants to be racist, he cannot. Tolerance is something natural for him (21 MIsLR5+SY).

This prospect - not supported by figures, since in Romania, on December 31, 2018, the number of Syrians holding the right to reside amounted to 5,282 persons, to which 2,769 Iraqis were added, to debate refugees from the Middle East - will be subjected to cultural analysis, in a later chapter dedicated to the effects of migration on Romania.

Other important aspects mentioned include religious issues, such as the fear of some states such as France, which already has a high Muslim population, to become Muslim majority over several generations (20 MCOPa4+RO).

3.5 Security-related effects concern a more consistent analysis, replacing a not very consistent specialized literature. In general, the specialized literature reduces security issues to individual (human) and national security issues, but their politicization, in relation with interests, preferences, or even in relation to values, sends the interpretation away from the desired epistemic neutrality. The analysis of the security issues generated by the migration crisis in Europe also raises important ethical issues (whose security is most important?, which of the security aspects must prevail?, to what extent human values gain grounds against ethnic or religious values? etc.), especially that security itself, as a subject of debate, cannot have a counter-argument: "Security is an alluring and intoxicating concept and often reckoned for as a winning argument" (Browning, 2017:42). Debate on security also involves discussing the latent threats and related risks. As a rule, these aspects are only observed through the glasses of the host culture, of the local communities in which immigrants are trying to integrate. The security problems invoked are related to the threats resulting from the analysis of the economic, social, political and cultural effects previously analyzed.

Our analysis, involving the sharing of views belonging to experts of different nationalities / ethnicities and religions, can provide a broad picture, if not, at least more detailed, of security under the migration conditions of the Middle East. Awareness of the effects of Muslim migration to Europe, after the cruel terrorist attacks in Madrid (2004) and London (2005), followed by awareness of the "crisis" (2015), led to the understanding of the complex risks involved, from the perspective of all dimensions (according to the perspective of the Copenhagen School).

> Migration poses major security risks to the involved states (of origin, of transit and of destination) through its effects on all dimensions of security:

political, economic, social, cultural and military. Since migration in all its forms is managed, better or worse, by political decisions, it is clear that citizens' perceptions about the efficiency of the governance system are influenced by the implications of the migration phenomenon over the quality and safety of their lives (02 MCOPU5+EN).

In all the years in which the effects of migration on security were made aware, immigrants did not commit more offenses than host state citizens, but nevertheless, some individual insecurity continues to manifest, some fears continue to be amplified by political discourses. Host countries need to "harmonize their informative-preventive efforts" and take a concerted and sustained action (24 MCOPU6+RO), they need joint programs to prevent the radicalization of young Muslims in European countries, as it happened in the Netherlands (17 MCCAI5+NL). However, in order for these efforts to lead to results, there is need for a concerted action, coordinated at EU or NATO level, with the main objective of solving the causes (the Middle East crisis) in order to solve the effects (migration) (06 MCOPU4+(09 MCOPa + RO), through inter-state dialogue mediated by supra-state structures, through intense exchange of information between governments (07 MCOPa4+RO), through continuous monitoring, co-operation between destination states and transit states by strengthening the external borders of the EU.

Still at the level of individual security, the prevention of radicalization means authentic education, free access to information and dialogue, doubled by the real will to establish peace (30 MCOPa4+RO). The crisis itself is politically exploited to the detriment of security, and violence in Europe, even if it is not produced by immigrants, occurs with migration (31 MCOPa4+RO) and it is easy to transfer the negative image from terrorist attacks and street violence towards the "migration crisis".

In terms of effects on national security, the deployment of large communities to different areas can lead to effects in time - see, for example, the current effect of large mass dislocations of people in the Eastern Soviet to Siberia - which can lead to intentions of border revision (02 MCOPU5+RO). The fight against terrorism is the great challenge of the European states' security, and in this respect, one of the interviewed specialists summarized the set of measures to be taken at the supra-state level first, and then, at the state level:

> The fight against terrorism within the EU must include rules for the prevention of terrorist acts, with a focus on new forms of terrorism; border security measures to identify / prevent terrorist elements from entering the community space; measures to combat online terrorist propaganda; exchange of information between states; monitoring / taking action against those in attention for activities that may indicate an interest in the terrorist phenomenon; control of armaments, explosives and precursors of improvised explosive ordnance; the control of Islamic radicalism and the extreme right, alike (06 MCOPU4+RO).

Last but not least, adequate migration policies, discouraging of illegal migration, reforming the asylum system and measures for the integration of third-party-country nationals (06 MCOPU4+RO) are necessary for strict control in a period of deep crisis in Europe.

4. "MIGRATION FLOOD" CANNOT BE PREVENTED THROUGH FENCING!

After the intensification of migration in Europe, a cynical joke was in circulation in Romania: "What are the advantages of migration for the Romanians? 1. The West ceased to accuse the Romanian Roma people of any crime, now accusing Middle Eastern immigrants. 2. Hungary found out its border with Romania." The joke itself brings about some complex information. Regarding the gross ratio of Romanian immigrants in the Western European countries, their number has decreased compared to immigrants from the Middle East. There are yet exceptions, and one of them is Germany, the state that is the most important destination for those coming from the Middle East. In Germany, starting with 2017, Romania is the most important immigrant provider: 73,000, compared to Syrians: 60,000, Poles: 34,000, Croats: 33,000 and Bulgarians: 30,000 (Romanian Insider, 2018 based on DWStatis, Statistiches Bundesamt) maintaining the percentages it has reached for the past three years.

Nevertheless, at the imagological level, the fears of Western Europe continue to be present relation to the waves of immigrants from the Middle East, and not in relation to Romanians.

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Fig.2 Comparative analysis of the number of immigrants in Germany between the years of 2008-2017 originating from Romania, Poland, Croatia and Bulgaria (*apud* Federal Statistiche Office, DWStatis Statistiches Bundesamt)

On the other hand, Romania is not a destination for immigrants. The image of the two Afghan immigrants who, having learned that they had mistakenly crossed the border with Romania, not Hungary, began to cry, asking to enter the readmission procedure, is very broadly mediatized (Gândul, September 15, 2015). From the official data obtained from the General Inspectorate for Immigration, at our request, the total number of foreign immigrants in Romania at 31 December 2017: 67,135, was lower than the total number of Romanian immigrants in Germany in the same year. Most foreigners with the right of residence come from the Moldovan Republic, while the Middle East countries supplying the large mass of European immigrants occupy the 4th place, through Syria and 6, respectively, through Iraq, to which countries affected by the effects of the Arab Spring, such as Tunisia, is added, on the 10th place. Put in a table, this data is as follows:

Table1. Number of foreign citizens with right of residence at 31st December 2017, in accordance with their country of origin, *apud* IGM Address no. 2751578/DMS/SAR

Citizenship	Total number
Moldova	10.313
Turkey	9.317
China	7.894
Syria	5.282
Israel	3.196
Irak	2.769
USA	2.193
Serbia	1.970
Ukraine	1.909
Tunisia	1.724
Other countries	20.568
Total	**67.135**

Of these, only 6,778 (about 10%) foreign citizens chose Romania for employment, for economic reasons. This data unequivocally places Romania outside the destinations sought by immigrants from the Middle East.

All interviewed experts highlighted this data: Romania is, to a very small extent, a transit country, Romania is unattractive for immigrants; Romania has obligations to accommodate a number of immigrants, established at the level of the European Union. Coming back to the point of view of the Syrian expert, according to whom Romanians are tolerant (21 MIsLR5+SY), respectively, to the view point of a Romanian expert, former presidential consultant on security issues: "Romania has experience from the communist period and some tools for the management of possible waves" (06 MCOPU4+RO), we find that there is a level of

institutional training and a high tolerance of the population for the migration phenomenon and that extreme right-wing speeches are missing. However, some experts say, there is a public discourse in which rejecting from a fear of knowledge is cultivated - and this rejection can take on proportions as long as "in Romania people live in euphoria" (13 MMoLR6+IL) - doubled by the lack of long-term integration policies, by the lack of budgetary allocation of funds for this purpose, by budget allocations for institution training, provided there is only a crisis preparedness (07 MCOPA4+RO). The existence of a National Migration Strategy (2015-2018), of some studies (Zaharia *et al.*, 2017) and relevant debates, such as, for example, *Impact of migration on the labor market at European level. How Does Romania Face New Challenges?*, are arguments in favor of asserting that there is a high degree above institutional average in this area (16 MCOPa4+RO). Romania, however, having institutions and bodies prepared to face the border challenge - given its experience as a state situated at the eastern border of the European Union and NATO - and at the same time being a safe and, predictable state, lacking extremist ideologies in its Parliament, leading a balanced policy that promotes dialogue, is bypassed by immigrants.

Some experts consider that Romania is not interesting because the standard of living is not high enough (12 MCOPa4+RO) and many immigrants do not know our country (20 MCOPa4+RO). Other experts point out that immigrants are not interested in Romania because the country is not an important player in the matters of immigration: Middle East conflicts (31 MCOPa4+RO). In conclusion,

> I do not believe there is any reason why the immigrants should not choose Romania, but the reality of the last years showed that Romania was not a destination for immigrants (09 MCOPa4+RO)

If the economic migrants do not yet have sufficient reasons to choose Romania, especially the unskilled and vulnerable, who are very poorly paid for such work, as some of the experts observe (08 FCOPa4+RO, 16 MCOPa4+RO), refugees can choose Romania because it is "a peaceful society in which life is not endangered", and because it is regarded as a "relatively democratic society in which they will not be politically persecuted" (08 FCOPa4+RO).

The most consistent explanations assume cultural foundations. Linguistic and especially religious homogeneity, the practice of Orthodox Christianity transform Romania into a homogeneous, absorbent bloc, capable of dissolving small communities of Muslims who would opt for this state as their final destination. From the perspective of personal security, these very characteristics could turn Romania into a desirable destination:

> Romania is not an attractive country for migrants because of its economic beckgorund and its relative cultural homogeneity. Yet, it is these very reasons why Romania could integrate migrants and provide them with jobs in economic sectors with a shortage of human capital. (15 MCOPa4+RO).

Adaptation to Romanian values and traditions (22 MCOPa4+RO) is, in fact, the great challenge of immigrants to Romania. Religious conservatism: "the action of Romanian Orthodoxy has an important impact" (10 MCOPa5+RO) it does not turn Romania into a destination for immigrants. Unlike the Orthodox space - another example, apart from Romania, is that of Greece, a transit country, humanitarianly involved in the crisis of refugees, but which is not a final destination for them – 'Western Europe is strongly secularized. The great cathedrals of Europe do not serve the purposes for which they were built. A sort of religious depression attracts the masses of immigrants toward this area. It is not only the economic rationale that determines the migration routes, but also the possibility of immigrant communities to express themselves, according to their cultural norms.

From this point of view, Romania (1) is not unattractive because there is no economic attractiveness: neither Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt nor the countries of North Africa are economically attractive, but the number of emigrants is higher in these countries than in Europe; (2) it is not unattractive because it is insecure: Romania is a security provider in the area; (3) it is not unattractive because of a popular rejection, as in the case of the Visegrad Group countries: Romanians are tolerant, yet, the unattractiveness comes from the fact that Romania is a homogeneous from the cultural, linguistic and religious perspectives.

5. CONCLUSIONS

A country without walls can avoid problems generated by the crises of history. China did not resist the invasion waves in the north based on its Great Wall. Nor will the "Trump Wall" stop migration from the South, from Latin American countries. Walls,

fences, curtains or dams do not stop the phenomena from their long-lasting development. They can be solutions for a short period of time, only. The waves of migration melt any barriers. "Noah's Ark", flood resistant, is eminently cultural – culture, open to the dialogue, equally characterized by the "strength of existence" (Mircea Vulcănescu) and by the power of assimilation, resists the challenges. Is this a Romanian lesson in the "crisis of migration"? Possibly yes, but it is equally Greek or Serbian lesson.

The true preparation of the "ark" for the challenges of history equals the attention paid to the security culture, with rigorous and authentic cultural foundations. Otherwise, the religious and, implicitly, cultural depression is established. In the symbolically vacated place - in the absence of identity, of the connection with the roots - there will always be someone to settle down. And that one will always be stronger, faster, more timely-adapted, capable of leading to the fall of Rome and all empires and caliphates built by conquest or seduction.

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